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INTRODUCTION:

Alternative dispute resolution has a long history.' Arbitration is a form of
alternative dispute resolution where the parties contractually agree to the issues
that will be decided, the arbitrators who will resolve the dispute, the rules of
arbitration that will be followed, and the arbitration forum that will be used.2
Today, arbitration is an attractive alternative to litigation in the business context
because of the relatively shorter length of time required to resolve disputes,
lower costs, greater control over the process, and increased privacy of the
process and results.3

1.
See JEROME T. BARRETT WITH JOSEPH P. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, at xxv-xxx (2004) (providing a timeline of alternative dispute resolution
from 1800 B.C. to the modern era); see also JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND LAW 454 (2005) (noting that "[a]rbitration has a long and venerable history, having
been used by many cultures in a variety of contexts over the centuries," and mentioning uses of
arbitration from biblical times through the Middle Ages and up to the modern era).
2.
See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 455-57.

3.

Id.

727
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In the United States, federal statutes and case law provide for broad
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Federal law requires that arbitration
agreements be enforced on their terms unless the agreements violate contract
principles. Federal law also provides that where state and federal laws conflict,
6
federal laws prevail.
South Carolina's arbitration venue statute, section 15-7-120(B) of the South
Carolina Code states that arbitration agreements requiring arbitration outside
South Carolina are not enforceable if the issue could be tried in South Carolina
courts. 7 This Note explores South Carolina's arbitration venue statute in light of

federal arbitration law, and in contrast with neighboring states' arbitration venue
statutes. When measured against federal law and other states' arbitration
statutes, South Carolina's statute both violates and is preempted by federal law.
South Carolina's arbitration venue statute should be redesigned more narrowly,
so as not to violate federal law, and in order to foster a more favorable business
climate in South Carolina.
Part I of this Note explores arbitration generally and the federal context for
enforcing arbitration agreements.
Part I shows that, under federal law,
arbitration agreements are to be broadly enforced according to their terms.
Further, under federal law, where federal and state laws conflict, federal laws
prevail. Part II explores South Carolina's arbitration venue statute and shows
how it violates, and is preempted by, federal arbitration law. Part III examines
other states' arbitration statutes and arbitration venue clauses, and explores case
law reviewing those statutes. By looking at statutes and case law in North
Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, and Georgia, Part III provides
alternative models to South Carolina's virtual exclusion of out-of-state
arbitration. Finally, in light of federal law and other state models, Part IV sets
forth proposals for reforming South Carolina's arbitration venue statute. By
making South Carolina more arbitration friendly, a revised arbitration venue
statute would also make the state more welcoming to businesses.

4.
See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (declaring written arbitration agreements "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable"); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 396407 (1967) (citations omitted) (affirming the district court's decision to stay court proceedings
pending arbitration); see also FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 521 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012))
(noting that parties can agree to court enforcement of arbitration results).
5.
See 9 U.S.C. §2 (2012).
6.
See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) ("[U]nder the Supremacy Clause,
the state statute must give way."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (footnotes
omitted) ("In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress
intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.").
7.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(B) (2005).
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ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL CONTEXT FOR ARBITRATION

A.

Arbitration:An Appealing Alternative to Litigation

Arbitration is a form of adjudicative private dispute resolution.8
In
arbitration, the parties agree to who will resolve the dispute, to the rules of the
dispute resolution process, and, generally, to be bound by the result. 9 Arbitration
is an attractive alternative to litigation in the business context.
Litigation can
be lengthy, costly, hard to control," and both the litigation process and result can
easily become public.1 2 In arbitration, by contrast, businesses help decide who
will resolve their disputes and the rules under which such disputes will be
resolved.1 3 Arbitration is also generally less expensive and less time consuming
than litigation,1 4 and unlike litigation, the arbitration process and the resultant
arbitral awards can often be kept private.
Arbitration thus provides an
appealing alternative for businesses that may welcome a method of dispute
resolution that, unlike litigation, allows greater control over costs and rules of
resolution, and affords them an opportunity to keep their disputes private.
B.

The FederalContextfor Arbitration

8. See THOMAS E. CROWLEY, SETTLE IT OUT OF COURT: How TO RESOLVE BUSINESS AND
PERSONAL DISPUTES USING MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND NEGOTIATION 171 (1994); FOLBERG
ET AL., supra note 1, at 453.
9.
See CROWLEY, supra note 8, at 171-73; FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 455-58
(noting the differences between arbitration and litigation).
10. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 454 ("Binding arbitration has long been an
attractive alternative [to litigation] for commercial parties, for whom courts were often too slow and
cumbersome, too expensive, too inflexible in remedy-making, and lacking in familiarity with
business practices."); see also Michael A. Hanzman, Arbitration Agreements: Analyzing Threshold
Choice ofLaw and Arbitrability Questions, FLA. B.J., Dec. 199614, 14 (discussing businesses' use
of mandatory arbitration clauses).
11. CROWLEY, supra note 8, at 171-73.
12. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 455 (noting that the desire "to escape the glare of a
public proceeding" is one reason businesses often prefer arbitration over litigation).
13. CROWLEY, supra note 8, at 172-73; FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 457-58 (quoting
Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High Stakes Employment
Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 112-13 (2002)); see also Shelley McGill,
Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legislative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J.
361, 364 (2010) ("[In arbitration, d]isputants customize a process suited to their own needs,
including the selection of an expert adjudicator.").
14. CROWLEY, supra note 8, at 171-72; see also Hanzman, supra note 10 (noting the
perception of arbitration as a means of providing fast and economic remedies); McGill, supra note
13, at 364 (describing speed as one of the benefits of arbitration). But see FOLBERG ET AL., supra
note 1, at 456 ("[A]rbitration may end up being just as lengthy or as costly as litigation."); McGill,
supra note 13, at 364 n.8 (disputing the assumption that going through arbitration is always cheaper
than going to court).
15. FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 456.
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Under federal statutory and case law, arbitration agreements are to be
broadly enforced.16 Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was
designed to create national uniformity in the treatment of arbitration agreements
and to make agreements to arbitrate as valid as any other contract.' 8 Section two
of the FAA provides that an agreement to arbitrate can only be invalidated on the
same grounds as any other contract:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.19

16. See, e.g., Hanzman, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted
federal arbitration laws as "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements"); cf FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 455 (noting that the courts'
increasing acceptance of arbitration is due "in large part . . . [to] legislative approval and
encouragement").
17. United States (Federal) Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012)).
18. Val Stieglitz, Update on State Statutes Restricting "Out-of-State" Arbitrations, IADC
ALTERNATIVE DisP. RESOL. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Int'l Ass'n of Def. Counsel, Chicago, Ill.), Feb.
2014, at 1, 2 n.1 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2012); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1748 (2011); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)), available at
http://www.iadclaw.org/assets/1/19/ADRFeb_2014.pdf; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (noting that at the time the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted, Congress faced
two problems, "the old common[]law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration
statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements"); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis
Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 275 (W. Va. 2011) (quoting Ann E. Krasuski, Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 263, 270 (2004)) ("'When Congress enacted the FAA, its purpose was twofold: to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements and to place arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts."'), vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr.,
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012) (per curiam).
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2. Note that the FAA thus applies to maritime contracts, as clearly stated in the
Act. The FAA also applies to contracts involving commerce, which has been held to mean
interstate or foreign commerce. See, e.g., Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 591, 553
S.E.2d 110, 115 (2001) (noting that to fall under the commerce provision of the FAA, "the
transaction must turn out, in fact, to have involved interstate commerce"); Soil Remediation Co. v.
Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454, 460, 476 S.E.2d 149, 152 (1996) (citing Timms v. Greene, 310
S.C. 469, 472-73, 427 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1993)) ("For the Federal Act to apply, the commerce
involved in the contract must be interstate or foreign."); see also 9 U.S.C. § 1 (defining commerce,
in part, as "commerce among the several States or with foreign nations").
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Federal statute thus mandates broad acceptance and enforcement of arbitration
agreements.20
Like the federal statute, federal case law supports broad enforcement of
arbitration agreements. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.,21 the Court upheld a lower court's stay of litigation pending arbitration

between the parties, even where a general claim of fraud was involved.22
Similarly, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 23 the
Court found an agreement to arbitrate enforceable, even though abiding by the
arbitration agreement would mean resolving the dispute in a forum that might
24
not recognize the antitrust claims at issue.
Other federal cases also uphold broad enforcement of arbitration
agreements. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,25 the Court affirmed a lower court that overturned a stay of arbitration

pending a state court decision26 and sought to compel arbitration between parties
27
to a construction contract with an arbitration agreement.
In holding that the
stay should be overturned and arbitration compelled, the Court said that
"[s]ection 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary."2 8 The Court also declared that "[t]he
[Federal] Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration."29
The Supreme Court has specifically addressed the issue of forum selection
clauses several times and found that such clauses should be enforced on their
terms, as in Mitsubishi.30

In the M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 3 1 the

20. This broad enforcement of arbitration agreements is required under the FAA in the
context of either maritime contracts or interstate or foreign commerce. All cases cited in the
remainder of this Note involve maritime contracts, interstate commerce, or both, such that the FAA
applied. The FAA does not apply to intrastate, as opposed to interstate, commerce. See Stieglitz,
supra note 18, at 3 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1; Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 398 S.C. 447, 458-60,
730 S.E.2d 312, 317-18 (2012)).
21. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
22. Id. at 399, 406-07.
23. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
24. Id. at 636-37.
25. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
26. Id. at 4 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); Will v. Calvert Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-67 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-21
(1976); Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1981) (en
banc)).
27. Id. at 8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012)).
28. Id. at 24.
29. Id. at 24-25.
30. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
31. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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Court held that where parties to an international maritime contract (though not an
arbitration agreement) selected a forum for dispute resolution, the forum
selection clause should be enforced, stating "[W]e conclude that the forum
,32
clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside." In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 33 the Court stated that "[a]n agreement to arbitrate
before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in
resolving the dispute."34 The Court used this reasoning to hold the parties in that
case to their agreement to arbitrate a securities dispute.35 The strength with
which the United States Supreme Court has declared that forum selection clauses
should be upheld becomes even more important in light of the South Carolina
arbitration venue clause discussed in Part III, infra, which attempts to void most
forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements.
In addition to broadly upholding the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and of forum selection clauses within arbitration agreements, federal law also
specifies that where federal and state laws conflict, federal law prevails. The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law is
"the supreme Law of the Land ... any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding." 36 In Southland Corp. v. Keating,3 the
Supreme Court reviewed a state court ruling that California franchise law
required judicial resolution of disputes, despite an arbitration agreement between
a franchisor and a franchisee. 38 The Court found that the FAA applied in state as
well as federal courts, and that the California law requiring judicial resolution of
franchise disputes violated the Supremacy Clause. 39 Referring to the FAA, the
Court declared that, "[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." 40 Likewise, in Perry v.
Thomas,41 the Court held that a California law allowing judicial resolution of
wage disputes regardless of an arbitration agreement violated the FAA and the
Supremacy Clause, and "under the Supremacy Clause, the state statute must give
way."42

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 15.
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 519-20.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10, 16.
Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
482 U.S. 483 (1987).
Id. at 491.
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Although federal law prevails, states can create their own arbitration laws.43
These state laws cannot, however, void valid arbitration agreements. In Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University,44 the Court held that the FAA did not preempt a stay of arbitration
under California law to allow related litigation to be resolved 45 because "[t]he
FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." 46 The Court
added, "But even when Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in
an area, state law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law .

...

48
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
the

Supreme Court found that section two of the FAA preempted a Montana statute
that required special notice be placed on contracts subject to arbitration, or the
arbitration agreement would be invalid.49 The Court declared that state "[c]ourts
may not .

.

. invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to

arbitration provisions., 50 The Court continued: "By enacting [section] 2 [of the
FAA] ... Congress precluded [s]tates from singling out arbitration provisions
for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed 'upon the
same footing as other contracts.'"5
Federal law provides for broad enforcement of arbitration agreements.52
Arbitration agreements are to be enforced according to their terms, including
their forum selection clauses.53 States can create their own arbitration laws, but
these laws cannot have the effect of singling out or invalidating otherwise valid
arbitration agreements.54 Where state and federal laws on arbitration conflict,
the federal laws prevail.
III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S ARBITRATION VENUE STATUTE

"In enacting [section] 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the

43. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1989).
44. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
45. Id. at 477-79 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
46. Id. at 477.
47. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
48. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
49. Id. at 687.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
52. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."56
In contrast to the broad acceptance of arbitration agreements, and the
enforcement of such agreements on their terms mandated by federal statute and
case law, South Carolina's arbitration laws have attempted to single out and void
arbitration agreements. South Carolina state courts have held that the FAA
preempts South Carolina arbitration laws that effectively invalidate arbitration
agreements.
Further, state and federal courts have specifically found that
South Carolina's arbitration venue statute violates and is preempted by the
FAA. 585 The courts have used this finding to compel out-of-state arbitration.59
Section 15-48-10(a) of the South Carolina Code provides that "[n]otice that
a contract is subject to arbitration . . . shall be typed in underlined capital letters,

or rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract and unless such
notice is displayed thereon the contract shall not be subject to arbitration." 60 The
61
South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts this statute,
using its finding to uphold arbitration agreements that did not meet the statutory
notice requirement.62 In Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Environmental, Inc.,63
the Court found that the arbitration agreement at issue did not meet the precise
64
notice requirements of the South Carolina statute.
However, the Court held
that the FAA preempted the state statute, making the agreement enforceable.65
Similarly, in Munoz v. Green Tree Financial Corp.,66 the Court held that the
FAA preempted the South Carolina arbitration notice requirement statute,6 7 and
compelled arbitration under the agreement. 68 The Munoz court said:
State law remains applicable [to arbitration] if that law . .. arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of

56. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
57. See Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 537-38, 542 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001);
Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454, 461, 476 S.E.2d 149, 153 (1996).
58. See Nat'l Material Trading v. M/V Kaptan Cebi, 1998 A.M.C. 201, 210 (D.S.C. 1997)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(B) (2005)); Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank
M. Hall & Co., 343 S.C. 396, 400, 540 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
59. See Munoz, 343 S.C. at 540, 543, 542 S.E.2d at 364, 366 (citing Soil Remediation Co.,
323 S.C. at 461, 476 S.E.2d at 153).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (2005).
61. See Munoz, 343 S.C. at 540, 542 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Soil Remediation Co., 323 S.C. at
461, 476 S.E.2d at 153).
62. See id. at 540, 543, 542 S.E.2d 364, 366 (citing Soil Remediation Co., 323 S.C. at 461,
476 S.E.2d at 153).
63. 323 S.C. 454, 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996).
64. Id. at 456-58, 476 S.E.2d at 150-51 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a)) (citing
Paschal v. State of S.C. Election Comm'n, 317 S.C. 434, 436, 454 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1995)).
65. Id. at 461, 476 S.E.2d at 152-53 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (1976)).
66. 343 S.C. 531, 542 S.E.2d 360 (2001).
67. Id. at 540, 542 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Soil Remediation Co., 323 S.C. at 461, 476 S.E.2d at
153).
68. Id. at 543, 542 S.E.2d at 366.
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all contracts generally. A state law that places arbitration clauses on an
unequal footing with contracts generally, however, is preempted if the
FAA applies. Accordingly, [title 15, chapter 48 of the South Carolina
Code], which applies specifically and exclusively to arbitration
69
agreements, is preempted in this case.
Less than a year later, in Zabinski v. Bright Acres Associates,70 the court
made a similar finding in relation to an arbitration agreement within a
partnership agreement. 7 ' Although the notice requirement of the South Carolina
statute was not met, 72 the court held that "the FAA provisions trump conflicting
requirements of South Carolina law, and arbitration is required" because the
73
partnership was involved in interstate commerce.
South Carolina's arbitration venue clause states: "A provision in an
arbitration agreement that arbitration proceedings must be held outside this State
is not enforceable with respect to a cause of action, which, but for the arbitration
agreement, is triable in the courts of this State." 74 The statute thus means that an
arbitration agreement need not be followed if the agreement requires out-of-state
arbitration, and the issue could otherwise be heard in South Carolina courts.
State and federal courts have specifically found that South Carolina's arbitration
venue statute violates and is preempted by the FAA, and courts have used that
finding to compel out-of-state arbitration in accordance with arbitration
agreements.76

69. Id. at 539-40, 542 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 281 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987); Soil Remediation Co., 323 S.C. at
461, 476 S.E.2d at 153).
70. 346 S.C. 580, 553 S.E.2d 110 (2001).
71. Id. at 596, 553 S.E.2d at 118.
72. See id. at 590, 553 S.E.2d at 115 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (2005)).
73. Id. at 596, 553 S.E.2d at 118.
74. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 15-7-120(B) (2005).
75. See Nat'l Material Trading v. M/V Kaptan Cebi, 1998 A.M.C. 201, 210 (D.S.C. 1997)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(B) (2005)); Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank
M. Hall & Co., 343 S.C. 396, 400, 540 S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
Presumably, South Carolina's arbitration venue statute also violates the State Uniform
Arbitration Act, found in title 15, chapter 48 of the South Carolina Code, which provides, in part,
that written arbitration agreements are "valid, enforceable[,] and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-4810(a). This statutory language clearly parallels the FAA, so to the extent that South Carolina's
arbitration venue law violates the FAA, it also violates South Carolina's arbitration law. Cf 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (using identical language). Interestingly, while South Carolina's Uniform
Arbitration Act and arbitration venue law are contained in the same title of the South Carolina
Code, title 15 on civil remedies and procedure, they are in separate chapters. The Uniform
Arbitration Act is found in chapter 48, while the arbitration venue law is found in part of chapter
seven on venue. See S.C. Code. Ann. §§ 15-7-120, 15-48-10 to -240.
76. See, e.g., Nat'l Material Trading, 1998 A.M.C. at 212 (ordering arbitration in London);
Tritech Elec., Inc., 343 S.C. at 400, 540 S.E.2d at 866 (citing Osteen v. T.E. Cuttino Constr. Co.,
315 S.C. 422, 425, 434 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1993)) (reversing a trial court decision refusing to compel
arbitration).
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'

In National Material Trading v. M/V Kaptan Cebi," the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, sitting in admiralty, explored
claims stemming from cargo damaged in maritime shipping.
In that case, the
parties had contractually agreed to arbitration in London, England. 79 The court
held that South Carolina's arbitration venue statute, and its purported avoidance
of agreements mandating out-of-state arbitration, did not make the agreement at
issue unenforceable, because the FAA controlled.s
The court noted that in
reviewing arbitration agreements in commercial contexts, the United States
Supreme Court "has clearly and unequivocally stated that, pursuant to the
provisions of the [FAA], such arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable." 8
The court used these findings to compel arbitration between the parties in
London, as per their arbitration agreement.82
In Tritech Electric, Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & Co.,83 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that the FAA preempted South Carolina's arbitration venue law
84
for transactions involving interstate commerce.
In that case, a Georgia
contractor and a South Carolina subcontractor were parties to several contracts
85
that included an agreement to arbitrate in Georgia.
When a dispute arose
between the parties, the subcontractor sued the contractor, and the contractor
filed a motion to dismiss the suit and compel arbitration, based in part on FAA
86
preemption of state laws.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that the
In
arbitration agreement violated South Carolina's arbitration venue law. 8
reversing the trial court, the appeals court held that the FAA preempted South
Carolina's arbitration venue law, and that the prohibition against state laws that
conflict with the FAA "specifically prevents state courts from requiring a
judicial resolution of a conflict which the parties agreed to arbitrate." 89
Without specifically citing South Carolina's arbitration venue law, the
court's decision in Ashley River PropertiesI, L.L.C. v. Ashley River Properties

77.
78.
79.

1998 A.M.C. 201 (D.S.C. 1997).
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 204.
80. Id. at 210 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(B)).
81. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012)).
82. Id. at 212.
83. 343 S.C. 396, 540 S.E.2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 400, 540 S.E.2d at 866 (citing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 (1996); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1983); Osteen
v. T.E. Cuttino Constr. Co., 315 S.C. 422, 425, 434 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1993); Trident Technical Coll.
v. Lucas & Stubbs, Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 104-05 & n.2, 333 S.E.2d 781, 785 & n.2 (1985) (per
curiam)).
85. Id. at 398, 540 S.E.2d at 864-65.
86. Id. at 398-99, 540 S.E.2d at 865.
87. Id. at 400, 540 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(B) (2005)).
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Osteen, 315 S.C. at 425, 434 S.E.2d at 283).
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II, L.L.C., 90 did cite related clauses, bolstering the argument that South
Carolina's arbitration venue clause violates and is preempted by the FAA. 91 In
Ashley River, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that South Carolina
courts lacked jurisdiction to void or modify an arbitration award made in New
92
93
York, even where South Carolina law governed the agreement. The award at
issue was made pursuant to the parties' agreement, which provided for
arbitration and jurisdiction in New York.94 Exploring the argument that South
Carolina law allows for judicial venue in South Carolina regardless of
agreements to the contrary,95 the court stated that "[t]he FAA requires courts to
enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in
accordance with their terms."96 The court further noted that it had previously
found that section 15-7-120 of the South Carolina Code violated and was
preempted by the FAA. 97
Unlike the broad acceptance-and enforcement-of arbitration agreements
on their terms required by federal statutory and case law, South Carolina's
arbitration venue statute attempts to void arbitration agreements that require outof-state arbitration.9
The FAA preempts state laws that violate its terms.99
Since South Carolina's arbitration venue law violates the FAA, state and federal
courts have expressly found that the FAA preempts South Carolina's law.1 00
IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR STATE ARBITRATION VENUE STATUTES

Together with South Carolina, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit covers North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia.
As such, the four other states' arbitration venue statutes, and their respective
judicial interpretations, present excellent comparisons to South Carolina.
Georgia, the only state bordering South Carolina that is not also in the Fourth

90. 374 S.C. 271, 648 S.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 2007).
91. Id. at 281, 648 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(A) (2005); Volt Info
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)) (citing 9 U.S.C.
§9 (2012); Tritech Elec., Inc., 343 S.C. at 400, 540 S.E.2d at 866).
92. Id. at 283, 648 S.E.2d at 301.
93. See id. at 275, 648 S.E.2d at 296-97.
94. Id. at 275, 648 S.E.2d at 297.
95. In this section of the case, the statute at issue was S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(A), which
attempts to allow causes of action to be brought in South Carolina regardless of contractual
agreement to bring them elsewhere and is obviously closely related to South Carolina's arbitration
venue statute.
96. Ashley River, 374 S.C. at 281, 648 S.E.2d at 300 (citing Volt Info Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at
478).
97. Id. (citing Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & Co., 343 S.C. 396, 400, 540 S.E.2d 864,
866 (Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam)).
98. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2015

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 3
738

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 727

Circuit, frequently competes with South Carolina for business,' 0' and has
recently updated its arbitration statutes, providing an interesting contrast with
South Carolina.1 02

Unlike South Carolina's arbitration venue statute, which attempts to void all
arbitration agreements requiring an out-of-state forum, neighboring states
generally put fewer restrictions on arbitrations, specifically on arbitration
venue.1 03 Arbitration statutes in neighboring states fall along a continuum, from
North Carolina, which is nearly as restrictive as South Carolina, to West Virginia
and Georgia, where statutes and case law provide for the broadest possible
acceptance and enforcement of arbitration agreements.1 04 Where other states
have attempted to restrict arbitrations or arbitration venue, courts have generally
concluded that the FAA preempts such restrictions.
A.

North Carolina

North Carolina's arbitration venue statute is almost as restrictive as South
Carolina's, providing that out-of-state arbitration of an issue stemming from a
North Carolina contract is void in nearly all situations and industries: "Except as
otherwise provided ... any provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina
that requires .

.

. the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the contract to be

instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is void and
unenforceable." 0 5 The statute then exempts from this general prohibition of outof-state arbitration non-consumer loan transactions and out-of-state arbitration
under a forum selection clause with the consent of the parties at the time of
dispute.1 06 Therefore, except in specific kinds of loan transactions or where at
the time a dispute arises the parties reaffirm their commitment to the out-of-state
forum they selected in their arbitration agreement, 0 7 North Carolina's arbitration

101. See, e.g., Douglas Sams, Georgia May Benefit as States Look to Trim Tax Incentives,
(May 20, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/printedition/2011/05/20/georgia-may-benefit-as-states-look-to.html?page=all (discussing the role tax
incentives played in Amazon's decision to build a distribution center in Columbia).
102. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-20 (Supp. 2014) ("The purpose of this part is to encourage
international commercial arbitration in this state, to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitration
awards, to facilitate prompt and efficient arbitration proceedings consistent with this part, and to
provide a conducive environment for international business and trade.").
103. Compare id. (stating that the goal of the law "is to encourage . . arbitration in this
state"), and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-1 (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that any controversy may be
submitted to arbitration), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (2013) (stating that any contract provision
that requires arbitration out of state is against public policy), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(B)
(2005) (declaring any provision in an arbitration agreement requiring out-of-state arbitration
unenforceable).
104. See sources cited supra note 103.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3.
106. Id.
107. Of course, at the time a dispute arises, the parties may not be disposed to agree to
anything, even something as seemingly innocuous as abiding by the terms of their original
ATLANTA Bus. CHRON.
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venue statute invalidates out-of-state arbitration for all North Carolina contracts.
As in South Carolina, state and federal courts have moved from upholding North
Carolina's public policy of requiring in-state arbitration to holding that the North
Carolina statute violates the FAA. 08 Courts have used this to uphold arbitration
agreements requiring out-of-state arbitration.1 09
In James C. Greene Co. v. GreatAmerican E&S Insurance Co.,1 0 the court
held that North Carolina's arbitration venue statute reflected a public policy
favoring in-state arbitration."'
Combining that public policy with the
inconvenience of out-of-state arbitration, the court found that the arbitration
agreement between the parties to an insurance agreement, requiring arbitration in
New York should not be enforced, and the matter should be referred for
arbitration in North Carolina.11 2 Other cases, including at least one earlier than
James C. Greene Co., have held that the FAA preempts North Carolina's
arbitration venue statute, and have used that finding to uphold agreements for
out-of-state arbitration.113

arbitration agreement. Deciding to reach an agreement in advance of any dispute is motivated in
part by the fact that the parties will not have to negotiate when a dispute arises.
108. Compare James C. Greene Co. v. Great Am. E&S Ins. Co., 321 F. Supp. 2d 717, 722
(E.D.N.C. 2004) (requiring arbitration within North Carolina, in part because of the state's public
policy), with Newman ex rel. Wallace v. First Atl. Res. Corp., 170 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593 (M.D.N.C.
2001) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)) (enforcing the arbitration venue clause and recognizing that the
court could not compel arbitration in a location contrary to that clause). As in South Carolina, North
Carolina's arbitration venue statute presumably violates state law on arbitration, which parallels the
FAA by providing that an arbitration agreement is "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon
a ground that exists at law or in equity for revoking a contract." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.6(a)
(2013). Also similar to South Carolina, North Carolina's arbitration venue law is separated from the
remainder of the state's arbitration law. North Carolina's Revised Uniform Arbitration Act is
located in article 45C of chapter 1, the chapter on civil procedure of the General Statutes of North
Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to .31 (2013). The arbitration venue statute is located in
chapter 22B of the statutes, the chapter containing laws about contracts against public policy. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3. This separation of arbitration venue law from the rest of arbitration law is
almost unique to South Carolina and North Carolina statutes among the state statutes reviewed in
this Note. Virginia puts a venue restriction in construction contracts, see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.0 1262.1(A) (2007), in a different chapter of the Code of Virginia title on civil remedies and procedure
than the Uniform Arbitration Act, see id. § 8.01-581.01 to .03 (2007). The remainder of the state
statutes reviewed in this Note, however, are found within the same subject areas of their respective
state codes.
109. See Newman, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4); Goldstein v. Am. Steel Span,
Inc., 640 S.E.2d 740, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
110. 321 F. Supp. 2d717 (E.D.N.C. 2004).
111. Id. at 722.
112. Id. Although the court ordered arbitration in North Carolina, it recognized that federal
law governs the applicability of forum selection clauses and a state policy favoring in-state
arbitration is not enough, by itself, to declare an agreement to arbitrate elsewhere invalid. Id. at 721
(citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30-32 (1988)).
113. See Newman, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)); Goldstein, 640 S.E.2d
at 743.
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In Newman ex rel. Wallace v. First Atlantic Resources Corp.,114 the court
held that despite the strong public policy of North Carolina requiring in-state
arbitration," 5 the FAA preempted the state statute's attempt to void the parties'
arbitration agreement.116 The court used this finding to uphold the parties'
agreement to arbitrate in Miami-Dade County, Florida." 7
Similarly, in
Goldstein v. American Steel Span, Inc.,118 the court upheld the agreement of the
parties to arbitrate in North Dakota, despite North Carolina's arbitration venue
law.1 9 The court stated:
It is uncontested that the FAA applies to this case. Because the FAA
preempts North Carolina law through the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, thus rendering the forum designation enforceable, we
hold that Fargo, North Dakota, as agreed upon in the parties' contract, is the
appropriate locale for arbitration.120
In United States ex rel. TGK Enterprises v. Clayco, Inc.,121 the court held
that the FAA preempted North Carolina's arbitration venue law, thus requiring
the parties to arbitrate in Missouri per their arbitration agreement.122 In making
this finding, the court distinguished between state laws that void arbitration
agreements altogether, and those that merely delay arbitration.123 State laws in
the former category, including North Carolina's arbitration venue law, are
preempted by the FAA because they "'require a judicial forum for the resolution
24
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.""1
Laws in the latter category, like the state law at issue in Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. that required a stay of arbitration pending litigation are not
preempted by the FAA when the agreement is subject to state law because
enforcing the state law also enforces the parties' agreement, which is the purpose
of the FAA.1 25

114. 170 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
115. See id. at 592.
116. Id. at 593 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
117. Id.
118. 640 S.E.2d 740 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
119. Id. at 743.
120. Id.; see also Aspen Spa Props., L.L.C. v. Int'l Design Concepts, L.L.C., 527 F. Supp. 2d
469, 473 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (holding that the FAA preempts North Carolina's arbitration venue
statute and upholding an agreement to arbitrate in Washington state on that basis).
121. 978 F. Supp. 2d 540 (E.D.N.C. 2013).
122. Id. at 548 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)).
123. Id. at 548-49 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 471, 478-79) (citing S. Concrete
Prods., Inc. v. ARCO Design/Build, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-194, 2012 WL 1067906, at *2, *6
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2012)).
124. Id. at 548 (quoting Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10).
125. See id. at 548-49 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 471, 479).
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North Carolina's arbitration venue statute attempts to void out-of-state
arbitration for nearly all North Carolina contracts.126 Earlier courts reasoned that
this statute, and the state public policy of rejecting out-of-state arbitration, could
be used to refuse enforcement of an agreement for out-of-state arbitration.127
More recently, however, state and federal courts have held that North Carolina's
statute, like South Carolina's, is preempted by the FAA because it attempts to
invalidate the arbitration terms to which the parties agreed.128
B.

Virginia

Virginia's arbitration statute requires broader enforcement of arbitration
agreements than either South Carolina's or North Carolina's statute. In language
that mirrors the FAA, Virginia provides for broad enforcement of arbitration
agreements, with exceptions where certain industries or parties are involved.129
The courts have held that the FAA preempts provisions of the Code of Virginia
that attempt to restrict arbitration venue.130
In language paralleling the FAA, Virginia law provides that arbitration
agreements are "valid, enforceable[,] and irrevocable, except upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."131 Virginia then
exempts from this general rule enforcing arbitration agreements any dispute
about employment or terms of employment involving an officer or employee of
the Commonwealth of Virginia.132 Virginia creates a further exception for
parties with a principal place of business in Virginia who are engaged in
construction in Virginia.1 33 In such a case, "[t]he forum for any arbitration
proceedings required . . . shall be in [Virginia].

If the contract provides for

arbitration proceedings outside [Virginia], such provision is unenforceable," and
arbitration can take place in the city or county where the work is located, or
elsewhere in Virginia if the parties agree. 134 Virginia's statutes therefore seem to
broadly uphold arbitration agreements, except as they pertain to state employees.
Virginia's statutes also preclude out-of-state arbitration for Virginia parties
engaged in construction within the state.
At least one federal district court has held that the FAA preempts the
Virginia statute attempting to invalidate arbitration venues outside Virginia in

126. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (2013).
127. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
129. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.01 (2007)
130. See, e.g., M.C. Constr. Corp. v. Gray Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548 (W.D. Va. 1998)
(quoting Glass v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 114 F.3d 446, 452 (4th Cir. 1997)) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4
(2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.1 (2007)) (concluding that a Virginia law requiring in-state
arbitration is preempted because it frustrates the objectives of the FAA).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.01.
132. Id.
133. See id. § 8.01-262.1(A).
134. Id. § 8.01-262.1(B).
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the construction context.1 35 In M.C. Construction Corp. v. Gray Co.,136 the court

held that the FAA preempted the Virginia statute and used that conclusion to
uphold an agreement to arbitrate in Kentucky.1 37 In MC. Construction Corp.,
the parties entered into two contracts for construction in Virginia, each
containing an agreement to arbitrate under the laws of Kentucky either at the
location of the project or in one of several Kentucky locations as chosen by
Gray, a Kentucky company. 138 The court found that section 8.01-262.1 of the
Code of Virginia reflected a public policy that Virginia construction contracts
should be arbitrated in Virginia, making arbitration in Kentucky contrary to
Virginia public policy.139

Nonetheless, the court concluded that the FAA

preempted the Virginia statute, and thus the arbitration should take place in
Kentucky.1 40 The court concluded that "[b]ecause it effectively negates
arbitration forum selection clauses in construction agreements, such as the one at
issue here, [the Virginia statute] 'obstruct[s] the realization and execution of
[c]ongressional objectives regarding the [FAA]."'141 Even though they are
limited to specific parties and projects within one industry, Virginia's restrictions
on arbitration venue in construction have thus been held preempted by the FAA.
C. Maryland
In Maryland, arbitration agreements are valid, except for agreements
between employers and employees.1 42 The Maryland Court of Appeals, the
highest court in the state, has further narrowed the scope of even this minimal
restriction on arbitration agreements. 143 Mirroring the FAA, the Maryland
statute provides that agreements to arbitrate are "valid and enforceable,
and ... irrevocable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract."1 44 The Maryland statute then provides that this general
rule of enforceability "does not apply to an arbitration agreement between
employers and employees or between their respective representatives unless it is
expressly provided in the agreement that this subtitle shall apply."1 45 Thus, the

135. See M.C. Constr. Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.1).
136. 17 F. Supp. 2d 541 (W.D. Va. 1998).
137. Id. at 548.
138. Id. at 543-44 & nn.1-2.
139. Id. at 546 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.1(B)).
140. Id. at 548 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.1).
141. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Glass v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 114 F.3d 446,
452 (4th Cir. 1997)).
142. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206 (LexisNexis 2013).
143. See Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon & Co., 467 A.2d 1025, 1026 (Md. 1983) (citing MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(b)).
144. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(a).
145. Id. § 3-206(b).
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Maryland statute makes arbitration agreements enforceable, except in employeremployee agreements.

146

The Maryland Court of Appeals has further narrowed the scope of
Maryland's statutory exception to arbitrability. In Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon
& Co.,147 an employment agreement between an accountant and his employer

that was subject to arbitration resulted in a dispute.1 48 The employer argued that
section 3-206(b) of the Maryland Code excluded an agreement between an
employer and a single employee from arbitration.1 49 On the other hand, the court
held that the statute only made arbitration agreements unenforceable in the
context of collective bargaining agreements, not agreements between an
employer and a single employee.1 5 0 The court used this determination to uphold
the parties' agreement to arbitrate.' 5 The Maryland exception to enforcement of
arbitration agreements is therefore very narrow in scope.
D.

West Virginia

Among Fourth Circuit states, West Virginia provides the broadest possible
enforcement of arbitration agreements and restricts parties from revoking their
agreements to arbitrate. 152 Case law strongly upholds this broad enforcement.1 53
Despite West Virginia's broad acceptance and enforcement of arbitration
agreements, the United States Supreme Court has held that a West Virginia
ruling violated the FAA by making certain arbitration agreements
unenforceable.1 54

West Virginia's statute provides: "Persons desiring to end any controversy,
whether there be a suit pending therefor or not, may submit the same to
arbitration . ...
State statute then strongly enforces the agreement of the
parties to arbitrate, declaring that "[n]o such submission [of a dispute to
arbitration] ... shall be revocable by any party to such submission, without the
leave of . . [a] court."1 56 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has

146. See id. § 3-206. Maryland statutory law also makes clauses requiring arbitration in
consumer insurance contracts void. See id. § 3-206.1 (LexisNexis 2013). However, there do not
seem to be any cases interpreting this provision, so it is not discussed in this Note.
147. 467 A.2d 1025 (Md. 1983).
148. See id. at 1026.
149. See id. at 1026 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(b)).
150. Id. at 1031 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(b)).
151. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(b)).
152. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-1 (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that "[p]ersons desiring to
end any controversy . . . may submit the same to arbitration"); id. § 55-10-2 (LexisNexis 2008)
(restricting the ability of parties to revoke their decision to arbitrate).
153. See, e.g., Hughes v. Nat'l Fuel Co., 3 S.E.2d 621, 624 (W. Va. 1939) (quoting W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-10-4 (LexisNexis 2008)) (citing W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-2 to -3 (LexisNexis
2008)) (stating that an "agreement to arbitrate . . cannot be revoked except by leave of court").
154. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (per curiam).
155. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-1.
156. Id. § 55-10-2.
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noted that the "purpose of statutory enactments on [arbitration] is to afford a
more efficacious procedure for the arbitration of controversies."
This strong stance towards enforcing arbitration agreements was reinforced
when the United States Supreme Court overturned a West Virginia ruling that
held certain arbitration agreements invalid.
In a case about arbitration clauses
in nursing home admission contracts, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that the FAA preempted a West Virginia state law that disallowed
arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts by requiring legal resolution of
injury claims against nursing homes.1 59 Despite this preemption, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated:
Congress did not intend for the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to
personal injury or wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive from
a written agreement that evidences a transaction affecting interstate
commerce, particularly where the agreement involves a service that is a
practical necessity for members of the public.160
The court used this finding to hold the arbitration agreements in the nursing
home contracts at issue unenforceable.161 The United States Supreme Court
overruled the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, finding that the West
Virginia court incorrectly interpreted the scope of the FAA.1 62 The FAA, the
Supreme Court said, "'reflects an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral
dispute resolution.""1 63 The Court noted that the FAA does not contain an
exception for injury or wrongful death claims.1 64 Further, when a state law
prevents arbitration of a type of claim, the FAA preempts that law,1 65 and "[t]hat
rule resolves these cases."'1 66 The Court used this holding to vacate the decision
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.1 67 Thus, even in the context of
West Virginia's broad acceptance of arbitration and broad enforcement of
arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court has found that an attempt to exempt
from arbitration a particular type of agreement that is otherwise subject to the
FAA is void.

157. Hughes, 3 S.E.2d at 624.
158. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1202, 1204.
159. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 263, 282 (W. Va.
2011) (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5C-15(c) (LexisNexis 2011)) (citing 9 U.S.C. §2 (2012)),
overruled by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1201.
160. Id. at 291.
161. Id. at 292.
162. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1202.
163. Id. at 1203 (quoting KPMG L.L.P. v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (per curiam)).
164. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
165. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1204.
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Georgia

'

As South Carolina's neighbor and natural competitor for business relocation,
Georgia's approach to arbitration agreements presents an interesting comparison
with South Carolina, as well as with other states in the Fourth Circuit. Georgia
actively recruits arbitration business and strongly upholds arbitration
agreements.168 Nearly three years ago, Georgia overhauled its international
arbitration rules169 to be friendlier to businesses seeking arbitration of their
international disputes.17 0 The new Georgia International Commercial Arbitration
Code now states in part: "The purpose of this part is to encourage international
commercial arbitration in this state, to enforce arbitration agreements and
arbitration awards, to facilitate prompt and efficient arbitration proceedings
consistent with this part, and to provide a conducive environment for
international business and trade."' 7
By providing this statutory infrastructure, together with physical
infrastructure and legal support, Georgia aims to become a chosen destination for
172
businesses seeking arbitration of their international disputes.
In the domestic arbitration context, Georgia law provides for broad
enforcement of arbitration agreements.1 73 Where Georgia law has sought to void
arbitration agreements, the courts have generally held that such attempts are
preempted by the FAA, except in particular industries.174 Georgia's statute says
arbitration agreements are "enforceable without regard to the justiciable
character of the controversy." 175 This provision contrasts sharply with South

168. See Stephen Wright, Georgia Seeks to Be Arbitration Centerfor InternationalBusiness
Disputes, SAPORTAREPORT (July 7, 2013), http://saportareport.com/blog/2013/07/georgia-aimingto-be-an-arbitration-center-for-international-business-disputes/comment-page-1/.
169. Although this Note focuses on arbitration involving commerce (which may be domestic
or international), Georgia's experience with international arbitration is noted here to demonstrate
how Georgia welcomes and recruits arbitration business.
170. See Enactment of the New Georgia InternationalCommercialArbitration Code Solidifies
Atlanta's Status as a Hub for International Arbitration, CLIENT ALERT (King & Spalding, Int'l
Arbitration Practice Grp., Atlanta, Ga.), June 5, 2012, at 1, 1 [hereinafter New GeorgiaArbitration
Code] (quoting
GA.
CODE ANN.
§ 9-9-20(b) (Supp. 2014)), available at
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca060512.pdf; Wright, supra note
168.
171. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-20(b).
172. See New GeorgiaArbitration Code, supra note 170, at 1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-920(b)); Wright, supra note 168.
173. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3 (2007).
174. See, e.g., Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631, 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (Supp. 2014); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11
(1984); DiMambro-Northend Assocs. v. Blanck-Alvarez, Inc., 309 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Ga. 1983);
CCC Builders, Inc. v. City Council, 229 S.E.2d 349, 352 (Ga. 1976)) (concluding that a state law
purporting to invalidate arbitration clauses in employment contracts was preempted by federal law);
cf GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c) (Supp. 2014) (listing situations in which the state arbitration code
does not apply).
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-3.
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Carolina where, if an issue is otherwise resolvable by the courts and an
arbitration agreement requires out-of-state arbitration, the provision requiring an
out-of-state arbitration need not be followed.176
In Georgia, arbitration
agreements are enforced regardless of whether the courts could decide an
issue.17 7 Georgia statute further provides broad arbitrability for issues covered
by an arbitration agreement, with exceptions for certain industries.
Further,
courts are required to broadly enforce arbitration agreements. 179
In the areas where Georgia has attempted to void arbitration agreements,
federal and state courts have held that the FAA preempts Georgia statutes,'s
with the exception of insurance, which is controlled by a federal law that makes
state rules the dominant law on insurance.1st In PrimericaFinancialServices,
Inc. v. Wise,182 the court upheld arbitration in a dispute arising out of an
employment contract containing an arbitration agreement despite the lack of
initialing on the arbitration agreement as required by the Georgia Arbitration
Act.183 The court added, "[W]e must conclude that 'the state law and policy with
respect [to the signature requirement] must yield to the paramount federal law
Similarly, one year later, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
[the FAA].
Southern District of Georgia held an arbitration clause in a mobile home sales
contract enforceable because the FAA preempted Georgia statutes that attempted
to exclude consumer transactions from arbitration.
More recently, the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that the FAA preempted Georgia statutes that attempt to

176. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(b) (2005) (invalidating provisions in arbitration
agreements requiring out-of-state arbitration), with Haynes v. Fincher, 525 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to -18 (2007 & Supp. 2014); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Barge, 483 S.E.2d 883, 888 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Weyant v. MacIntyre, 438 S.E.2d 640,
642 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)) ("The General Assembly's adoption of the Georgia Arbitration Code
establishes a clear public policy in favor of arbitration.").
177. See Ga. Code Ann. § 9-9-3.
178. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c) (excluding from the state's arbitration code agreements
dealing with medical malpractice, collective bargaining, insurance, certain consumer loans,
consumer goods, some consumer transactions, sales and financing of residential real estate,
employment agreements if the arbitration agreement is not initialed by all parties at the time of
signing, agreements to arbitrate future bodily injury and wrongful death claims, and any areas
covered by another arbitration statute).
179. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-6 (2007).
180. See Pate v. Melvin Williams Manufactured Homes, Inc. (In re Pate), 198 B.R. 841, 845
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631, 635 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995).
181. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2012) (codifying the McCarran-Ferguson Act); McKnight v.
Chi. Title Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3)).
182. 456 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
183. Id. at 632, 635 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(9)) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-1
(2007)).
184. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting CCC Builders, Inc. v. City Council, 229
S.E.2d 349, 352 (Ga. 1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Pate v. Melvin Williams Manufactured Homes, Inc. (In re Pate), 198 B.R. 841, 842-45
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).
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void uninitialed arbitration agreements in employment contractsl86 and
arbitration agreements related to future injury. 8 7 The court used these rulings to
uphold arbitration in a claim involving defamation by a past employer where the
employment contract contained an arbitration agreement.' 88
Federal and state courts have found that the FAA does not preempt Georgia
statutes attempting to void arbitration in the insurance industry. 8 9 In McKnight
v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,1 90 the court ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, a federal law which makes states-rather than the federal government-the
principal regulators of the insurance industry,191 prevailed.1 92 The court used
this holding to find that the FAA did not preempt a Georgia statute which
attempted to void arbitration agreements in the insurance industry, and thus
arbitration was not required under the arbitration agreement in the insurance
contract at issue. 9 3

Georgia thus provides broad acceptance and enforcement of arbitration
agreements. In the international arbitration realm, Georgia has recently changed
its arbitration laws, upgraded physical infrastructure, and created a legal
infrastructure that allows businesses to bring their international disputes to
Georgia for arbitral resolution.194 With regard to domestic arbitration, Georgia's
statutes uphold arbitration agreements more broadly than South Carolina's
statute. 95 Where Georgia statutes have attempted to void arbitration agreements
in particular industries, the courts have held that the FAA preempts such statutes,

186. See Davidson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 748 S.E.2d 300, 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (citing
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012); Langfitt v. Jackson, 644 S.E.2d 460, 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)).
187. See id.
188. Id. at 303.
189. See, e.g., McKnight v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the Georgia statute regulating arbitration clauses in insurance contracts was not preempted by
the FAA). At least one court has held that the arbitration agreements need not be enforced in the
context of future personal injuries or wrongful death, where section 2(c)(10) of the Georgia Code
voids such arbitration agreements. See Dream Maker Constr., Inc. v. Murrell, 603 S.E.2d 72, 72-73
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004). It is worth noting, however, that the court in that case distinguished the
arbitration agreement at issue as one that did not raise FAA issues. See id. at 73 (citing Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co.,
583 S.E.2d 466, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Haynes v. Fincher, 525 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999)).
190. 358 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2004).
191. See id. at 857 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012)).
192. Id. at 859 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (Supp. 2014); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Equity
Residential Props. Trust, 565 S.E.2d 603, 605 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)).
193. Id.; see also Love v. Money Tree, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Ga. 2005) (stating, with regard
to an arbitration agreement in an insurance contract, that "[b]ecause the application of the FAA
would impair a statute of this State regulating the business of insurance, we conclude that the
[McCarran-Ferguson Act] preempts the FAA and prohibits the enforcement of the parties'
arbitration agreement").
194. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
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except where another federal act makes state law the predominant law in an
industry.16

V. A

PROPOSAL TO REFORM SOUTH CAROLINA'S ARBITRATION VENUE CLAUSE

When viewed against neighboring states, South Carolina's arbitration venue
statute is more restrictive. South Carolina's statute attempts to void all
arbitration agreements requiring out-of-state arbitration.1 97 Other states in the
Fourth Circuit fall along a continuum in regard to upholding arbitration
agreements. At one end of the spectrum is North Carolina, which is nearly as
restrictive as South Carolina, and where courts, as in South Carolina, have

'

overruled statutory restrictions on enforcement of arbitration.198 At the other end
of the spectrum is West Virginia, which allows for very broad enforcement of
arbitration agreements, and where the courts have narrowed any exceptions to
such enforcement.1 99 In between lie Virginia and Maryland with limited
restrictions on arbitration or arbitration venue, which courts have consistently
narrowed or overturned.200
South Carolina's non-Fourth Circuit neighbor,
Georgia, has actively sought to become friendlier to international arbitration.
Georgia provides broad enforcement of domestic arbitration agreements, and
courts have overruled statutes that attempt to void arbitration agreements in
specific industries, except where those industries are governed by state law.20
South Carolina's arbitration venue law is not only more restrictive than
those in neighboring states, but has also been held preempted by the FAA. This
holding is not recent. At least since 1997 in the maritime context,202 and since
2000 in relation to interstate commerce,203 courts have held that section 15-7120(b) of the South Carolina Code is preempted by and violates the FAA by
204
attempting to void arbitration agreements.
South Carolina is thus long
overdue for an update to its arbitration venue statute.

196. See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
197. See supra PartIII.
198. See supra Part IVA.
199. See supra Part IV.D.
200. See supra Part IV.B-C.
201. See supra Part IV.E.
202. See Nat'l Material Trading v. M/V Kaptan Cebi, 1998 A.M.C. 201, 210, 212 (D.S.C.
1997) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120(B) (2005)).
203. See Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & Co., 343 S.C. 396, 400, 540 S.E.2d 864, 866
(Ct. App. 2000) (citing Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989); Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1983); Osteen v. T.E. Cuttino Constr.
Co., 315 S.C. 422, 425, 434 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1993); Trident Technical Coll. v. Lucas & Stubbs,
Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 104-05 & n.2, 333 S.E.2d 781, 785 & n.2 (1985) (per curiam)).
204. Because the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act parallels section 2 of the FAA in
calling for broad enforcement of arbitration agreements, South Carolina's current arbitration venue
law also presumably violates state arbitration law. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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An improved arbitration venue statute for South Carolina would provide for
broad enforcement of arbitration agreements.
South Carolina's improved
arbitration venue statute should begin by providing the broadest enforcement of
arbitration agreements. This could be done by paralleling the language of the
FAA itself, as in section 8.01-581.01 of the Code of Virginia or section 3-206(a)
of the Code of Maryland. Although section 15-48-10(a) of the South Carolina
Code currently parallels the FAA in language similar to the Virginia and
Maryland statutes, South Carolina's arbitration venue law directly conflicts with
both the FAA and the state arbitration statute. South Carolina's improved
arbitration venue law could be incorporated into, and brought into conformance
with, the State Uniform Arbitration Act. If that were done, providing for broad
enforcement of arbitration agreements in line with the FAA's requirements,
South Carolina's arbitration venue statute would no longer be preempted by and
in violation of either the FAA or the State Arbitration Act.
An improved South Carolina statute would also need to be responsive to the
agreement of the parties and other arbitration related rules. Language could be
included in the statute to indicate that if the parties agree to alter their arbitration
agreement, the new agreement would be enforced. This would be similar to the
provision in section 22B-3 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which
allows the parties to agree to out-of-state arbitration at the time a dispute arises,
which is otherwise void under North Carolina statute. By providing that the
agreement between the parties as well as any amended agreement will govern
disputes, South Carolina's arbitration venue statute would then meet the FAA's
goal of enforcing the parties' agreement. Further, a revised arbitration venue
statute would have to provide for exceptions from the broad enforcement of
arbitration agreements for those parties or industries that may otherwise be
exempt. This would parallel the exemption of insurance contracts from
arbitration, which has been upheld by courts, found in section 9-9-2 of the
Georgia Code.
In revising its arbitration venue law, South Carolina could learn much from
Georgia, which has recently updated its arbitration laws. By broadly enforcing
arbitration agreements and providing a legal and physical infrastructure to
support arbitration, Georgia has become a choice location for businesses to
205
arbitrate.
Georgia statute even explicitly welcomes businesses to arbitrate
206
within the state.
South Carolina should consider adding similar language
welcoming arbitration to a revised arbitration statute.
Not only would these proposed changes to South Carolina's arbitration
venue law end South Carolina's violation of the FAA, it would make South
Carolina a more attractive location to do business. Arbitration is appealing to

205. See New GeorgiaArbitration Code, supra note 170, at 1; Wright, supra note 168.
206. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-20(b) (Supp. 2014) ("The purpose of this part is to encourage
international commercial arbitration in this state . . and to provide a conducive environment for
international business and trade.").
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businesses as an alternative to litigation for resolving commercial disputes.
Compared to litigation, arbitration generally provides lower costs, more control
of the dispute resolution process, and more privacy, all of which may be valuable
to businesses.
Since South Carolina's current arbitration venue statute
invalidates all out-of-state arbitration, it makes South Carolina a less attractive
place to do business. Businesses in South Carolina know that state statute
purports to invalidate an arbitration agreement providing for venue anywhere
outside of South Carolina. By updating its arbitration venue statute to welcome
arbitration agreements regardless of venue, South Carolina would be more
attractive as a business locale, as Georgia has become.208 If South Carolina
becomes a more appealing location to do business by being friendlier towards
the arbitration processes that businesses favor, the state's economy may benefit
from increased growth.
VI. CONCLUSION

Arbitration is particularly attractive to businesses. Arbitration provides
businesses with more control, less costs, and more privacy than does the
litigation of disputes. In the United States, federal statute and case law provide
that arbitration agreements are to be broadly enforced. South Carolina's
arbitration venue statute, by contrast, attempts to void all arbitration agreements
requiring out-of-state arbitration. In so doing, South Carolina's statute violates
and is preempted by the FAA, a fact that has been judicially recognized for more
than fifteen years. In comparison to its neighboring states, South Carolina's
statute is more restrictive. Other states broadly welcome and enforce arbitration
agreements. Where those states have attempted to void arbitration agreements or
restrict venue for arbitration, the courts have generally held such state statutes to
be preempted by the FAA unless another law provides that state law
predominates in a particular industry.
At least one of South Carolina's
neighbors, Georgia, actively seeks to be the venue of choice for arbitration and
attempts to make it simpler to arbitrate in Georgia.
South Carolina's arbitration venue statute is thus overdue for revision. By
making the statute more welcoming, and broadly enforcing arbitration
agreements, South Carolina could become a more attractive location for
businesses that favor arbitration. If companies choose to do business in South
Carolina due in part to more arbitration friendly laws, South Carolina's economy
could benefit.

207. See supra Part II.A.
208. See New Georgia Arbitration Code, supra note 170, at 1; Meredith Hobbs & Julie Kay,
Miami Int'l Arbitration Soc'y, Miami, Atlanta Hustling to Become InternationalArbitration Hubs,
MIAS BLOG (July 29, 2014), https://miamiinternationalarbitration.com/blog/?p=86; Wright, supra
note 168.
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